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DISCUSSION, OF RECENT DECISIONS

known as "Discussion of Recent Decisions." He himself
has done considerable research work and has also written on legal
topics for the REVIEW. His most recent article is that on "Jurisdiction in Will Contest Cases," which appeared in the REVIEW
in June, 1930.
REVIEW

Professor Pickett teaches the courses in Evidence, Wills, Conflict of Laws, and Applied Jurisprudence in which courses he
has attained distinction as a legal instructor.
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
RIGHT TO PARK VEHICLES IN PUBLIC STREETS.-The right of a
driver of a private automobile to park his automobile, that is,
to leave it standing repeatedly for long periods, in front of a
private residence against the protest of the owner of the premises
was decided in Decker v. Goddard.' The plaintiff's home was in
a residential section of the city of Rochester, New York, where
parking for more than six hours was forbidden by city ordinance. The defendant, contending that this gave him the right
to park for less than six hours, parked his car for a considerable
number of days, a number of hours each day, in front of the
plaintiff's residence, despite the plaintiff's remonstrance and protest. The trial court 2 refused the plaintiff relief by injunction,
but the Appellate Division reversed the case and directed judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the relief demanded.
To evaluate the decision of the New York court properly we
shall examine the law on these points:
1. The primary use to which highways and streets are dedicated.
2. The rights in the public street or highway of one whose
land abuts thereon.
3. What constitutes an obstruction.
4. Whether the municipality may give a concession in the
public streets, that is, permit or authorize the maintenance of
an obstruction in the streets.
5. What obstruction of the streets is proper when permitted by public authority.
6. Whether the legislature may, in the general exercise of its
police power, curtail or encroach upon the rights of abutting
owners of city realty, so as to give members of the traveling
1 233 App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. S. 440.
2 139 Misc. Rep. 824, 249 N. Y. S. 381.
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public the right to park3 their automobiles along the curb in
front of such private property.
1. Streets and highways are, from the manner of their creation, of two kinds: First, those of common law dedication and
second, those of statutory dedication. In streets of the first
type, like other common law monuments, the fee vests in the
adjoining owners to the center of the street, subject to the easement of the public for purposes of travel; in those of the second
type the fee vests in the municipality or the political subdivision
in trust for the public. The primary purpose, however, for
which all highways and streets are established is to furnish the
public with a place for travel. Never has this been questioned.
In the language of one court it is said that a street is a public
way from side to side and from end to end. 4 From the words
of another opinion we learn, "Streets and highways are dedicated, secured, and maintained primarily for public transit, and
must be so preserved. "5 Our own Supreme Court says, "The
public has a paramount right to the use of the streets in all
its parts. That right is the right of all persons to pass over it
freely and without impediment whenever they have occasion to
do so."6 The law's first concern, then, will be to see that this,
the appropriate use of the streets, is protected. The members
of the public may exercise this right on foot or by private
vehicle, or by hack, bus, street car, or other public conveyance
operated for their convenience-in every present safe vehicle and
in others that may be devised in the future. 7 And the occasional
stopping and standing of vehicles near abutting property, not
continued an unusual or unnecessary length of time is spoken
of as part of this appropriate and primary use of the streets.8
Yet it has been held that a member of the traveling public has
no right to stop and scrutinize the transactions of a dweller by
3 To "park'' as used in this paper means more than a short or temporary stop, but rather a long continued or repeated storing of a motor
vehicle. In Revised Chicago Code of 1931 Busch and Hornstein, Chapter
38, Article 1, section 1970, parking is defined. "Park: To stand a vehicle, whether occupied or not, for a period of time greater than is
reasonably necessary for the actual loading or unloading of persons or

materials. I I

4 State v. Sugarman, 126 Minn. 477.

5 Pugh v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593.
6 Tolman and Company v. City of Chicago, 240 Ill. 268.
7 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) p. 1178, 1179.
5 O'Linda v. Lothrop, 38 Mass. 292; Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217;
Duffy v. City of Dubuque, 63 Iowa 171; Smethurst v. Proprietors Ind.
Cong. Church, 148 Mass. 261; Cordano v. Wright, 139 Cal. 610.
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the roadside, where that abutting owner controls the fee and
objects to the observation.9
2. The abutting owner, too, has very definite rights. They
have been held 10 to be: First, the right to access, often referred
to as that of ingress and egress; second, the right to light and
air; third, the right of view; fourth, the right to have the street
continued and kept open as a public street for the benefit of his
abutting property; and fifth, the right to whatever adds to the
value of the streets of an abutter. The right to access implies
the right to stop before his property in a vehicle, 1' to pick up and
set down guests, 12 and to take up and unload goods. 18 The right
of an abutting owner temporarily to put skids across the sidei4
walk to facilitate the unloading of goods has been affirmed.
On the other hand, it is no deprivation of the right of access that
the abutting owner is forbidden, by the operation of a city ordinance, from moving a crane of great weight off his property.25
Nor may he object that, because the street is limited to a certain
type of vehicle, he must employ a circuitous route to reach his
destination.'" The right to light and air gives the abutting
owner the right to the full benefit of the column of light, air,
and sunshine in the street from the surface to the sky,1" not
9 Hickman v. Maisey, L. R. [1900] 1 Q. B. 752. See also Adams v.
Rivers, 11 Barb. 390.
10 Park Hotel Company v. Ketchum, 184 Wis. 182.
11 An ordinance forbidding all stopping of vehicles in the loop district in Chicago, between certain hours, was held invalid, Haggenjos
v. City of Chicago, 336 Ill. 573.
12

Ibid.

18 Ibid; Tolman v. City of Chicago, 240 Ill. 268; Garibaldi and Cuneo
v. O'Connor, 210 Ill. 284.
14 Tolman v. City of Chicago, 240 II1. 268.
A city cannot tax the privileges of having a driveway into lot across
sidewalk, nor may a city prohibit one, unless in interest of public
safety, but if one have access from an alley, he cannot insist on a driveway in front.
City of Shawnee v. Robbin Brothers Tire Company,
134 Okla. 142. See annotation following case in 66 A. L. R. 1052;
also see annotation in 22 A. L. R. 942 on power to regulate or prohibit; filling station may lower curb and install driveway, annotation
47 A. L. R. 902. Owner of public parking place by mandamus proceedings compelled authorities in control of street to issue permit to construct a second driveway across sidewalk, although he already had
one. Scholz v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, 264 Ill. App. 409. For
power of city to compel removal of driveway it has previously authorized see Wood v. City of Richmond, 148 Va. 400.
15 The People v. Linde, 341 fI1. 269.
16Malleable Iron Company v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, 263
Ill. 446; Ferguson Coal Company v. Thompson, 343 Ill. 20.
17 Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 556; Gerstley v. Globe Warnicke Company,

304 Ill. 270.
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only to the center of the street but clear across the street"s and
as far up and down the street as may serve his property. 19 He
also may insist that the rain and snow fall unimpeded in the
street.20 The abutting owner has a right to an unobstructed22
21
view of all happenings in the streets, or above the streets,
which would be visible save for some obstruction in the street.
Thus, if a man have a rustic seat in his garden, he may object,
if an obstruction, placed in the street by his neighbor, bar his
enjoyment of the moon's soft spell. The right of view carries
with it the corollary right of being seen. In a New York case 23
the maintenance of an awning over the street by the defendant
was enjoined. The plaintiff objected that because of it his second floor show window could not be seen from the street. Pillars on the sidewalk to ornament a bank building have also been
enjoined at the suit of an adjacent abutting owner. 24 Whether
the owner holds the fee to the center of the street or not, these
rights are property rights, and the courts will protect them as
such.2 5 Of course, the owner cannot complain of any infringement of his easements that arises as an incident to the public's
use of the street for purposes of travel.
3. Anything that obstructs or impedes the streets, then, is a
nuisance and subject to the general law of nuisances-if it interferes with the public's right of travel, it is a public nuisance;
if it encroaches upon the easements of an abutting owner, it is a
private nuisance; and no private individual may sue to abate
a public nuisance unless it be also to him, in the enjoyment of
his property, a private nuisance. Many obstructions are listed
in the cases. Thus, we read of overhead bridges across an alley, 2
Is Fry v. O'Leary, 141 Wash. 465.

19
20
21
22

Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 556.
Gerstley v. Globe Warnicke Company, 340 Ill. 270.
Shield v. Peninsula Land Company, 147 Va. 736.
Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 556; Gerstley v. Globe Warnicke Company,

340 Ill. 270.

23Brown Brand Realty Company v. Saks, 214 N. Y. S. 810.
24 First National Bank of Montgomery v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459.
25Park Hotel Company v. Ketchum, 184 Wis. 182; 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.) sees. 587-b, 656-a; Lewis, Eminent Domain,
(2d Ed.), sec. 91-f and authorities cited in footnotes. The nature of
the easements of abutting owners where the fee of the street is in the
city is discussed in Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 556: "The dedication of
the street by the plat, the sale of the lots with reference to it, conveyance of the abutting lots, and the payment of the money for the
conveyances were elements sufficient to create the right. The right
may be regarded in the nature of an incorporal hereditament. It becomes appurtenant to the lots."
20 Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 556; Gerstley v. Globe Warnicke Company,
340 Ill. 270.
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unloading platforms, 27 a lunch wagon stopping to do business, 28
a vendor's stand in the street,29 carriages stored in street,80 a bay
window extending eighteen inches over the sidewalk, 3 1 a hack
stand,8 2 a cab stand, 38 street car tracks,3 4 a news stand,3 5 and
trees growing on the sidewalk. 86 An examination of these and
other cases shows that the courts are generally ready to enjoin
the maintenance of anything that obstructs the street and interferes with the rights of either the traveling public or the abutting
landowner. Indeed the writer found only one case3 7 where it
might be said that the court refused to abate by injunction an
improper obstruction of the streets at the suit of the people.
Where the courts have refused injunction relief to an abutting
owner, it will usually be found that the obstruction he complains
of as a private nuisance is necessary to, or useful to, the public's
enjoyment of its right to travel in the streets. To give an extreme
case no one would seriously contend that an abutting owner
might enjoin the erection of a light-post on the sidewalk in front
of his premises which was reasonably necessary to the adequate
illumination of the street. But all cases are not so simple. Often
the court must make a nice decision and choose between the
accommodation of the traveling public and the full preservation
of the easements of the abutting owner in the street.
A review of some of the cases will reveal the principles that
guide the courts. In 1812, in Rex v. Cross,38 Lord Ellenborough
said, "No one can make a stable-yard of the King's highway."
He held that a stage coach may set down or take up passengers
in the street, but that this must be done with reasonable promptness, and that private premises must be obtained where the coach
may stop in between. one journey and another. It was, indeed,
27

Tolman v. City of Chicago, 240 Ill. 268.

28 Strong v. Sullivan, 180 Cal. 331.

29 Schopp v. City of St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131; Pagames v. City of Chicago, 111 Ill. App. 590; City of Chicago v. Christ Verdon, 119 Ill. App.
495. A lease of a portion of a sidewalk cannot be the basis of a suit
to recover rent. Heineck v. Grosse, 99 Ill. App. 441.
30 Rex v. Cross, 3 Camp. 224.
31 Anisfield Company v. Grossman and Company, 98 Ill. App. 180.
32McFall v. City of St. Louis, 232 Mo. 716.
City of Duluth v. Esterly, 115 Minn. 64.
34 General Electric Railway Company v. Chicago 1. and L. Railway
Company, 98 Fed. 907.
35 Hofeler v. Buck, 180 N. Y. S. 563.
36 Vanderhurst v. Tholcke, 113 Cal. 147.
33

37 The People v. Hart, 154 Ill. App. 237.
38 3 Camp. 224.
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an indictable offense for stage coaches to stand in the street
soliciting passengers, or for anyone to block the public's passage
through the street. This principle was recently restated that
no one can make a private garage of the public street. 89 And in
Rex v. Jones, 40 a case of a lumber merchant, who, because of the
narrowness of the street and the construction of his own premises,
had been forced to deposit long sticks in the street and to saw
them there into shorter pieces before they could be carried into
his yard, Lord Ellenborough was of the opinion that the defendant was guilty of a nuisance. "A car or wagon may be
unloaded at a gateway, but this must be done with promptness.
..."
The defendant "is not to eke out the inconvenience of his
own premises by taking the public highway into his timber yard;
and if the street be too narrow, he must remove to a more commodious situation for carrying on his business."
The Supreme Court in Illinois has enunciated this same doctrine and added that if an abutting owner, in the conduct of
his business, so litters the sidewalk with crates and boxes that
a pedestrian is forced to use a narrow passageway between the
boxes and. the crates, and in walking through that passageway
the pedestrian slips on some object there and is injured, the
owner may be held liable in damages, even though the object
which caused the injury cannot be traced to him, for he assumes
a legal duty41to exercise reasonable care that such passageway
be kept safe.
4. Many of the cases are complicated by the fact that the
obstruction is maintained in the street under a local ordinance
that purports to authorize it. Vending stands or market stands
are an example. In cases involving them, it has been held that
the city holds and controls the streets for the use of the general
public and cannot grant to anyone the exclusive right to their
use, or the right to the exclusive use of any part of them for
private gain. 42 Similarly it was laid down in The People v.
Clean Street Company48 that a city cannot grant an exclusive
right to an individual or a corporation to use the streets for
advertising purposes; it is of no moment that the city may have
made a desirable or profitable bargain with the one so using the
streets. Ordinances authorizing an abutting owner to build an
39 Pugh v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593. This is probably the
leading case on the regulation of the parking of automobiles.
40

3 Camp. 230.

41

Garibaldi and Cuneo v. O'Connor, 210 Ill. 284.
Cases cited in footnote 29.

42

43 225 Ill. 470.
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overhead bridge across an alley have been declared void.44
Indeed, it'has been held that where a city ordinance purported
to authorize one to store his wagon, when not in use, before his
place of business and the city collected a fee for this privilege,
the city was guilty of maintaining a nuisance and liable in
was hurt, in
damages for injuries incurred by a pedestrian who
45
passing the wagon, by an object falling from it.
5. While the only safe rule is that all public highways, from
side to side and from end to end, are held for the use of the
public, it does not follow that every obstruction would constitute
a purpresture or be illegal. Under present day law hacks and
and taxis standing in the street soliciting fares are not a public
nuisance if they are complying with all ordinances passed for
their regulation. The development of the law in this respect is
well stated in Masterson v. Short.46 The system of hackney
coaches standing at designated places in the streets grew out of
a public demand in cities for a means of transit from point to
point other than by walking. Special police regulations assigning certain places where they might stand were adopted to
prevent the hackmen from roaming the streets in empty vehicles
in search of passengers and to prevent them from standing in
inconvenient locations, but more especially to make certain that
hacks would be standing at various points where the public
would be likely to want them. "Such a regulation, however, is
not a grant of, but a legitimate limitation upon, the use of the
streets in the public interest.'' 47 This use of the streets is subject to the further restriction that it will not interfere with the
rights of abutting, property owners. 48 If a cab stand is established by ordinance before a city hall or other municipal building, no one can object; but if the stand be established 49before
private property, the owner may get relief by injunction.
Although the above view is the law, broadly stated, in every
44Field v. Barling, 149 Il. 556; Gerstley v. Globe Warnieke Company, 340 Ill. 270. On the other hand a revocable permit which authorized Marshall Field and Company to build a subway below surface of
Washington Street connecting its two stores was upheld as valid, The
People v. Marshall Field and Company, 266 Ill.
609.
-45 Cohen v. Mayor, Alderman, and Commonalty of the city of New
York, 113 N. Y. 532.
46 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 154.

47 Park Hotel Cbmpany v. Ketchum, 184 Wis. 182.
4SIbid; Branahan v. Hotel Company, 39 Ohio St. 333; McFall v. St.
Louis, 232 Mo. 716; Ewbank v. Yellow Cab Company, 83 Ind. App. 737.
See footnote 53, ififra.
49 Ibid.
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common law jurisdiction, there arc some disturbing cases. For
example, in Pennsylvania Company v. City of Chicago50 an injunction was denied the railroad company suing as an abutting
owner to restrain the City of Chicago from continuing a stand
for hacks and express wagons, which the city had established by
ordinance on Canal Street between Adams and Monroe Streets
along the side of the Union Station in Chicago. The decision
can only be reconciled on the ground, stated in the opinion, that
a railroad depot in a city is in the nature of a public building
and that consequently the property must bear a greater servitude
than ordinary abutting property. Judge Cartwright dissented
at length and with great vigor. Relief was also denied in
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel Company v. City of New York. 51 Here
the court decided in favor of the validity of an ordinance establishing a stand in front of the hotel, and declared that the plaintiff's right, as abutting owner, to access, light and air was preserved by a provision in the ordinance requiring a minimum
space of thirty feet width to be left open in front of the principal
hotel entrance. The court rested its opinion upon the ground
that the fee of the street was in the city, and for this reason the
property must bear the servitude. Though these two cases
modify the general rule, 52 they comport with the exigencies
of the situation, for the courts, realizing-that certain institutions,
such as depots, hotels, and the like, are semi-public in their nature and that they seek the concourse of many people, have
hesitated to refuse the city the right to establish stands. Obviously, stands are needed elsewhere than before strictly public
buildings. A convenient way around the difficulty is for the
city to designate certain places as cab-stands, provided the cab
men secure the permission of the abutting owner.5 3 This arrangement is open to the objection that in fact it gives to an
abutting owner the right to grant special privileges in the public
street to one and to withhold them from others, or to grant a
more favorable position to some, when all including the owner
50 181 Ill. 289.
See Donavan v. Pennsylvania Company, 199 U. S.
279, six years later, involving the same property.

51212 N. Y. 97; reargument denied, 212 N. Y. 609.
52 Ordinarily an hotel will be granted relief by injunction.
Branahan v. Hotel Company, 39 Ohio St. 333; Park Hotel Company v. Ketchum,
184 Wis. 182. For railroad, see Kenyon Hotel Company v. Oregon Short
Line Railroad Company, 62 Utah 364.

case in 33 L.
The right of abutting owners to control cab stands
and parking in the street is the subject of an annotation, following
Park Hotel Company v. Ketchum, in 33 A. L. R. 355. Many cases are
cited and discussed. The effect of the character of the abutter, whether
hotel, depot, private business place, or residence is also discussed.
53 McFall v. St. Louis, 232 Mo. 716 and note on that

R. A. (N. S.) 471.
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himself,
should only be entitled to equal privileges upon equal
54
terms.
In the street car cases the courts have held repeatedly that
the construction or operation of a railroad in the streets of a
city authorized by the city council will not be enjoined at the
suit of an abutting owner. 55 Courts of most of the states, (New
York is an exception), hold that a street railway constructed
at street grade is not a new servitude upon the land, because
such use is within the purpose for which a street is laid out and
maintained-public travel. It must be regarded as among the
uses contemplated when the street was dedicated and opened.
If the abutting owner suffer consequential damages, he must
pursue his remedy at law. The same doctrine that holds that
the trolley-posts and tracks of a surface line impose no new servitude or unlawful use was applied to the pillars and other erections of an elevated line in Doane v. Lake Street Elevated Railroad Company.56 There it was held that these structures were
but a necessary part of the public street, aiding and facilitating
its use for purposes of travel and transportation. For the
diminution of the value of his property the landowner was
remitted to his remedy at law. This doctrine was later somewhat qualified or developed in a Federal case, General Electric
Railway Company v. Chicago I. and L. Railway Company.57
That was an appeal from an interlocutory order ,forbidding the
General Electric Railway Company from entering upon Fourteenth Street at Dearborn Street and upon Custom House Place
between Fourteenth Street and Polk Street, Chicago, for the
purpose of constructing thereon a street railway. The order was
sought and granted upon the ground that the operation of the
proposed railway would so interfere with access to the freight
house and track yard of appellee that it would cause it a special
injury for which an adequate remedy at law could not be had,
and that the ordinance by which appellant was asserting right
to build was void. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
order forbidding the construction of the street railway and dis54 Park Hotel Company v. Ketchum, 184 Wis. 182;
City Council of
Montgomery v. Parker and West v. Brown, 114 Ala. 118; City of Duluth
v. Esterly, 115 Minn. 64.
55 Stewart v. Chicago General Street Railway Company, 166 Ill.61;
Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 212; authorities cited and discussed in
C. B. and Q. Railroad Company v. Street Railroad Company, 156 Ill.
255.' Even where suit is brought by Attorney General in the name of
the People an injunction will not be granted if it appear that real
purpose of suit is to protect some private interests, The People ex rel.
Maloney v. The General Electric Railway Company, 172 Ill. 129.
Se 165 Ill. 510.

57 98 Fed. 907.
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tinguished the facts from Doane v. Lake Street Elevated Railroad Company.58 It interprets that case as meaning that the
abutting owner will be remitted to his remedy at law only when
he may get adequate relief there, and that it does not apply to
a case like the present, where the injury amounts to the destruction of the total or substantial use of the property. Within the
limits set out in the eases just discussed, a city may authorize
those obstructions in the public streets which facilitate public
travel.
6. In examining parking ordinances we notice that most,
like the Chicago ordinance, 59 are negative or prohibitive, that
is, they restrict parking in certain districts altogether, and in
others between certain hours. Nothing is said about the unrestricted areas; no right to park is conferred. And even those
ordinances which allow parking in certain specified places are
held by the courts to be nothing more than police regulations
that settle the matter between the city and the owner of the
automobile and do not attempt to preclude the abutting -owner
from objecting. 60
Under the statutes of most states a city has, by virtue of its
general police power, the plenary right to regulate the use of
the streets by motor vehicles. 61 We may now raise the interesting question whether the legislature, or the city council, where
the power is delegaled, may, through the exercise of its police
power, grant to members of the public who travel by automobile the right to park their cars at the curb before private property of all classes, residence property included, and force the
property to accept the burden of receiving the automobiles. The
police power has been defined as "the inherent right of every
organized government to provide for the safety and welfare of
,its people."' 62 The only restrictions upon this'power are constitutional prohibitions and the doctrine of reasonableness. 63
"The police power of a state extends not only to regulations
58 165 Ill. 510.
59 Chapter 38, Article VI, sections 2013-2019, Revised Chicago Code
of 1931, Busch and Hornstein.
60 Lowell v. Pendleton Auto Company, 123 Or. 383; 1 Berry, Law of
Automobiles, (6th Ed.) see. 84.
61 1 Berry, Law of Automobiles (6th Ed.) see. 30, 31; 1-2 Huddy, Encyclopedia of Automobile Law (9th Ed.) see. 68. See Cahill's Illinois
Revised Statutes, 1931, Ch. 24, Art. 5, par. 65 in particular sections 7 and
9.. City of Chicago v. Kluever, 257 Ill. 317. The power of the city to
exclude is limited in Chicago Motor Coach Company v. City of Chicago,
337 Ill. 200.
62 Deems v. Baltimore, 60 Md. 173.
63 City of Chicago v. Kluever, 257 Ill. 317.
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designed to promote public health, public morals, and public
safety, but also to those designed to promote public conven.
ience." '64 The legislature in the exercise of its police power may
'consider problems arising from new inventions and endeavor to
adjust rights and harmonize conflicting interests by statutes for
the public welfare. 65 Now our question is whether, if the legislature-to discourage the tearing down of buildings in busy
parts of the city and the converting of property into parking
places for hire, or to furnish motorists with an ever convenient and free place to park, or for some good reasonishould decide that it was reasonably necessary to authorize66
the parking of automobiles at the curb alongside private
property, such legislation would be upheld as valid. It would
be comparatively easy, from the text books and the cases,
to prepare a respectable brief answering this question in the
negative. In a recent article of. merit, 67 Mr. William H. Lloyd,
in touching upon this point, suggests that the rule of Rex v.
Cross, "No one can make a stable yard of the King's highway,"
might be urged, in behalf of small home owners and shop keepers, against such a law with as much force today as it was by
Lord Ellenborough in 1812, and further that if such a law were
likely, appraisers in condemnation proceedings for the opening
of a new street might properly consider it in awarding greater
compensation.
However, as an example of the liberal attitude of the
courts68
in dealing with an exercise of the police power, the reasoning of
the Virginia Court in the case of Wood v. City of Richmond69
is submitted. This case decided that a city could require the
removal of a filling-station driveway which it. had previously
authorized and which the owner had constructed at great expense, and that while the owner of property abutting on the
street had an easement of access therein, which amounts to a
property right, the exercise of such right is subordinate to the
right of the municipality derived by* legislative authority to
64 Town of Wake Forest v. -Medlin, 197 N. C. 83.
65 The People v. Linde, 341 ll. 269.
66 The right would have to be conferred in explicit language, for such
legislation, in derogation of the rights of 'abutting owners, would be
strictly construed.
67 "The Parking of Automobiles, "1 77 University of Pennsylvania taw
Rev. 336.
68For a discussion of the tendency of the United States Supreme
Court in dealing with state legislation under the police power see "The
Supreme Court and State Action Challenged under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1931-1932," 81 University of Pennsylvania Law* Review 505.
69 148 Va. 400.
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control the use of the streets so as to promote the safety, comfort,
health, and general welfare of the public. The court quoted this
passage from 29 Corpus Juris 547: "An abutting landowner on
a public highway has a special right of easement and use in the
public road for access purposes, and this is a property right
which cannot be damaged or taken from him without due compensation. . . . " Admitting :that principle to be sound, the
Virginia Court shows its limitation and quotes with approval
from an earlier opinion: "Every owner of property . . . is
bound so to use and enjoy his own as not to interfere with the
general welfare of the community in which he lives. It is the
enforcement of this. . duty which pertains to the police power of
the state so far as the exercise of that power affects private
property. Whatever restraints the legislature imposes upon the
use and enjoyment of property, within the reason and principles
of this duty, the owner must submit to, and for any inconvenience or loss which he sustains thereby he is without remedy.
It is a regulation and not a taking, an exercise of the police power
and not of eminent domain.' ,70
in view of the reasoning of this case, although no decision on
the matter and, indeed, no legislation attempting it, is found, it
is likely that a statute, or a city ordinance, where the power
has- been delegated, giving to members of the traveling public
the right to park along the curb in front of abutting private
property and abrogating to that extent the easements of such
abutting owners would be upheld in the majority of American
jurisdictions. 71 Whether, under a particular ordinance, an abutting owner had been left a reasonable access to his property in
each instance would be a question on which all courts probably
would not agree. Some, no doubt, would insist upon a clear
space, in .front of the entrance to the property.
The likelihood that city councils will soon pass such legislation
is not great. There is the danger of damage suit by abutting
owners, who possibly might show that their easements were unlawfully interfered with. At any rate, today, such legislation
is unnecessary, because the drivers of automobiles and abutting
owners alike assume that when ordinances forbid the parking and
storing of automobiles in the street in certain areas, such ordinances not only permit (as far as the municipality is concerned), but, (against abutting owners), confer the absolute
70 Bowman v. State Entomologist, 128 Va. 362. This case held constitutional a statute providing for the destruction of cedar trees that
were host to the cedar rust of the apple..-.

71 Missouri seems to have committed itself in MeFall v. St. Louis, 132
Mo. 716.
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right of, parking in the unrestricted areas. This assumption is
evidenced by the fact that cars line the curb from one crossing
to the next; it is seldom that an abutting owner objects.
To return now to the principal case of Decker v. Goddard, the
decision granting an injunction to the plaintiff appears sound.
The parking ordinance of the city of Rochester was negative,
merely forbidding parking for more than six hours, and it conferred no right on the defendant as against abutting owners.
The plaintiff is asserting his abutter's rights in residence property. The defendant was not seeking to make a necessary or
temporary stop such as might be considered incidental to his
use of the highway as a member of traveling public, but was
claiming the right to store his car for long
periods of time day
72
after day in front of private property.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT TO ADOPT.-"

Specific

performance of a contract to adopt "--the phrase would, to a
scholar of the law, appear to be an inconsistency-was the relief
prayed for in Winkelmann v. Winkelmann,1 a recent Illinois case.
That adoption was unknown at common law and is now only
permissible by the aid of a statute is well known. 2 Where a
statute is in derogation of the common law the statute must be
strictly complied with before the courts will offer any relief.
This is an elementary rule of construction and supported by
Deere v. Chapman,3 Arms v. Ayer et al.,4 and many other cases
needless to mention. From -that one would argue that specific
performance of such a contract would be impossible, for if the
statute is strictly complied with, the aid of a court of equity is
not required; and if it was not strictly complied with, a court of
equity would be helpless because of the fundamental rule as to
construction of said statutes. But the courts in nearly all the
jurisdictions recognize the ability, power, and jurisdiction of a
court of equity to grant relief to a person for whose benefit the
contract was made. The Federal court has admitted the power
of a court of equity to do so in Jaffee v. Jacobson;5 Georgia in
72 Turner and Stoddard v. Holtzman, 54 Md. 148, asserted the right
of a property owner by his own act to abate a similar nuisance. The
defendant had led away a horse drawn omnibus which the driver had
persisted in leaving in front of the defendant's premises.
1 345 Il.

566.

2 Bartholow v. Davies, 276 Ill. 505.
3 25 Ill. 498.
4 192 Ill. 601.

5 48 Fed. 21.
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Crawford v. Nelson; 6 Iowa, in Chehak v. Battles; 7 Missouri, in
Sharkey v. McDermott;8 Nebraska, in Kafka v. Rosicky; 9 New
Jersey, in Van Tine v. Van Tine;10 New
12 York, in Godine v.
Kidd;" Vermont, in Durkee v. Durkee.
In Winkelmann v. Winkelman, the court decided that a court
of equity will grant specific performance of an oral contract
to adopt a child, if the child has performed her part of the
contract and if the contract is not objectionable for want of
cossideration, Statute of Frauds or illegality.
In that case the complainant was a daughter of Reinhard
and Minnie Albrecht. Her mother died eight days after her
birth, leaving another son and daughter. The evidence showed
that August Winkelmann orally promised to take all the
three children and adopt complainant if one Backhaus, who
was a brother of Minnie Albrecht, would work for him and
take care of the children. The complainant was born on the
second day of January, 1900, and on February 25, 1900, was
baptized in an Evangelical church. The certificate read:
"This child was through this baptism by August Winkelmann
and his wife, Margaret, born Backhaus, adopted."
There
were no other legal proceedings to adopt. The testimony,
however, showed that complainant was regarded by Winkelmann as his child and that he made statements showing that
he considered her as his child and that complainant addressed
Winkelmann as "papa" while her brother and sister called
him "uncle."
After Winkelmann's death in 1926, complainant brought a bill for specific performance seeking to be adjudged an heir of Winkelmann.
The court granted specific performance on the grounds
that it would be inequitable to let the contract remain unexecuted, since' the complainant had performed her part.
The court said: "Oral agreements to adopt, not followed by
legal adoption, have been held to be valid and enforceable,
provided they are made by parties competent to contract, are
based upon a sufficient consideration, are not objectionable
as being within the operation of the Statute of Frauds and
are not in contravention of some principle of public policy."
6 139 Ga. 654.

133 Iowa 107.
891 Mo. 647.
7

941 Neb. 328.
10 15 AtI. 249 (N. J. Ch.), 1 L. R. A. 155.
11 19 N. Y. S. 335.
12 59 Vt. 70.
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The court, rightfully, said that the contract had been
proved and that the terms were reasonable, clear, and specific. The evidence was such that a contract was clearly
shown-contracts of this type are required to be established
by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. 13
The court decreed the complainant an heir of Winkelmann
and permitted her to share in the distribution of the estate.
This is the only effective way the court can grant specific
performance, for decreeing a person a child of a deceased is of
itself no relief. There is, really, no advantage in being decreed a child of a person unless that child is enabled to share
in his estate. That is an incident of the contract to adopt.
One can readily see that if the adopting parent dies testate
and does not provide for the child in his will the court cannot
grant specific performance. Since the child may be cut out
in the will, even as an adopted child, specific performance
would have nothing concrete to operate on.
Before we begin to analyze the principles underlying the
decisions in this type of cases, let us review a few of the outstanding cases.
Chehak v. Battles14 is the leading case on the subject. That
was a bill for specific performance of a written contract to
adopt. The statute required that the contract be signed by
all the parties interested and recorded. The contract in this
case was not signed by two of the parties and was not recorded. The complainant performed her part and the court
granted the relief prayed for saying: "The surrender of the
child by its parent to another, who at the time agrees to
adopt the child as his own or to devise property to or to make
him his heir, is generally held as a valid consideration, and
as it is made for the benefit of the child, he may maintain an
action for specific performance. .

.

. The Statute of Frauds

cuts no figure in the case, for part of the consideration, the
surrender of the child, was paid at the time the agreement
was executed. Nor is the Statute of Frauds an obstacle to
the performance of such contracts. Notwithstanding . . .
there has been full performance by the party demanding relief when this is sought ....

So an agreement of the adoption

may fall short of meeting the statutory requirements and yet
be a valid and enforceable contract ....

If the child has filled

the place of a dutiful daughter to the adoptive parent until
attaining majority, the financial benefit stipulated in the contract of adoption ought not to be denied because through
13
14

Peterson v. Bauer, 83 Neb. 405; Tuttle v. Winchel, 104 Neb. 750.
133 Iowa 107.
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the neglect of another, without fault on her part, statutory
adoption has not been effected. The consideration according
to the petition has been fully paid on the one side, the child
surrendered by her mother, the name of her foster parents
borne, and all the advantages which youth and affection can
bestow enjoyed; while on the other side, though the adoptive
parents have cherished and maintained her as their own, they
have not performed that portion of their promise which entitled her to share in their estate, and this we hold ought in
justice and good conscience to be specifically enforced."
Let us now turn to one of the most interesting cases on the
subject, Tuttle v. Winchel. 15 The writer will give a rather
detailed discussion of the case as it practically contains all
the law and equity on this subject.
The complainant, G. H. Tuttle, was the child of Mr. and
Mrs. Purdy. After Mr. Purdy's death, the mother was in
financial difficulties and had to work away from home and
thought it would be for the best interest of the complainant
to have some one care for him or adopt him. Mr. and Mrs.
Tuttle lived in the neighborhood and were very well situated
financially. They had one daughter, Isabelle, who later married Winchel. Mrs. Purdy testified that after the Tuttles
heard that she wanted some one to look after the boy they
called upon her, saying that they wanted him as their own;
that they would have adoption papers taken out and that
he would receive the same care as their daughter. They took
him with them, and although the mother and the complainant
lived in the neighborhood for a long time, she never asserted
any right or control over him.
The evidence showed that the boy remained
a member of
the Tuttle family and was known in the neighborhood and
in school as George H. Tuttle. He and Isabelle lived together until she later married Winchel. The complainant left
the home of the Tuttles at the age of twenty-one, with their
consent and approval.
The defendant produced three witnesses who testified that
Mrs. Purdy said that the Tuttles never adopted the child, but
merely took him to care for, and that adoption papers were
never taken out, because Mrs. Purdy might want him when
she re-married.
After the death of both Mr. and Mrs. Purdy the complainant brought this bill for specific performance. The defendant relied mainly on two defenses, first that the contract
15 104 Neb. 750.
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was not established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence, and second, that there had been no performance on the
part of the complainant. The lower court granted the relief prayed for and on appeal the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the decision of the lower court.
As to the first point of defense, the defendant contended
that Mrs. Purdy's testimony should be discredited as it would
be impossible for any one to remember all the details of a
conversation which occurred thirty-eight years ago.
The Supreme Court, however, said that the evidence was
not improbable. Quoting from the case: "The fact that a
definite and final separation was contemplated as a consideration of the agreement is borne out by the fact that the
mother never afterwards reclaimed or sought to interfere with the
child, although she married again and continued for twenty
years to live in the same neighborhood."
The court also said that there was nothing in the evidence
which would show any reason for the Tuttles not wanting
to adopt complainant, but on the contrary, that there was
evidence tending to show that the Tuttles were anxious to
adopt him. Quoting, again, from the case: "Considering also
the attitude, circumstances and conduct of Mr. and Mrs.
Tuttle in the matter, we find nothing to indicate that they
would have been reluctant to adopt the boy and to give it the
rights and status of a child of their own. Mr. Tuttle's daughter, Isabelle, was twenty years of age, and likely before long
to leave them, as she did when she married in 1885. It was
quite natural that they should feel the need and desire for
another child in the family, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that, after finding a child that suited them, which they
were willing to take into the family and to keep in that inimate relationship from early infancy, they intended in taking
it to make the child, by adoption, in every sense of the word
their own. . . . We are mindful of the rule that parol contracts of this character must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. . . . Giving due weight to the
evidence and arguments presented by the defendant, we are,
nevertheless, convinced that there was a contract on the part
of Mr. and Mrs. Tuttle to adopt the plaintiff and to give
him the same rights as if he had been their own child."
The defendant also contended that there was no performance on the part of the complainant, and therefore, the
court should not grant the relief prayed for. They introduced evidence to the effect that the complainant was insolent, mischievous, and unwilling to work, and that he made
little return for what the Tuttles did for him.
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As to this contention the court said: "The mother's per
formance of the contract was complete upon surrender of
the child."
The complainant performed his contract by
staying with Mr. and Mrs. Tuttle, and the mere fact that he
was disobedient and adverse to work did not, in the court's
opinion, vitiate the contract. His relation to the family still
continued.
To allow a court of equity to grant specific performance
of any contract, the contract must be founded on a valuable
consideration; its terms must be complete, certain, and definite; it must be proved by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence; and it must be of such nature that the complainant has no adequate remedy at law for the breach of it.
Even if all these requirements are met, the court has discretionary jurisdiction and will not grant the relief if the
granting of such relief would work a hardship on any of the
defendants. The contract must be fair, equal, and just in
all respects. 16
The consideration for the contract may be of two sorts-it
may move either from the natural parent or from the child.
The surrender of the natural rights from the parent or the
performance of services by the child is sufficient consideration. The loss of the love and affection of the natural
parents and the bearing of love and 17affection for the adoptive
parents would likewise be sufficient.
In Goodine v. Kidd,'8 the court said: "Upon these facts, who
would question the worth, adequacy, and sufficiency of the
consideration received by the adopting parents. Lives that
were drear and blank are thus often times cheered and animated, and filled with new hopes and ambitions, fresh impulses and awakened energies. These are the contributions
of youthful love and affections and companionship to childless old age."
Because the court is dealing with an oral contract and must
rely solely on the veracity of the witnesses, the courts have
held that the contract must be proved by clear, convincing,
and satisfactory evidence. 19 The courts realize that the temptation would be great for perjury if the above rule were not set
16 John Norton Pomeroy, Jr., A Treatise on Equitable Remedies,
(3d Ed.), II, see. 762-765, 768.
17 Chehak v. Battles, 133 Iowa 107; Tuttle v. Winchel, 104 Neb. 750;
Healey v. Simpson, 113 Mo. 340.
18 19 N. Y. S. 835.
19 Tuttle v. Winchel, 104 Neb. 750, and cases there cited.
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out and enforced. It is needless to expound on this any longer, but it would not be amiss to say that the evidence need
not be direct, for in many cases all parties, except the complainant, are dead. It is sufficient that the evidence clearly
shows that the parties contemplated adoption
and intended
20
to have the complainant as their own child.
The courts of law clearly afford the complainant no adequate remedy for the breach of the contract. Unless the contract for adoption contains some written provision to devise
a certain portion of the estate to the complainant, there is
no adequate remedy at law. If contract contained such provision, the action at law would be brought for the breach
of that provision and not for the breach of the contract to
adopt; it is difficult to imagine how damages would be grantable under any other circumstances in an action at law. The
courts have held that where the plaintiff has lived with the
defendant, or defendant's decedent, as a member of his family, the plaintiff cannot recover even the reasonable value
of the services rendered, for it is presumed that these services
were rendered gratuitously. If, however, there had been a
promise to convey to the plaintiff a portion of the estate as
consideration for the adoption, even though the promise were
oral, the courts allow the plaintiff to recover the reasonable
value of the services rendered, as the presumption that the
services were rendered gratuitously is rebutted. It is clear that
the plaintiff could not sue on the oral promise to convey as that
is within the Statute of Frauds. 21
As was previously mentioned, the jurisdiction of a court
of equity, in granting specific performance, is purely discretionary, and if the court feels that it would be inequitable to
grant such relief, it will not do so, even though all the necessary elements are present. So a court will not grant specific performance where the consideration has been illegal or
immoral and where, to grant such relief, would deprive the
natural children of their rights to inherit. 22 The courts of
equity, therefore, do not overstep their jurisdiction in granting such relief. They merely follow the well established and
settled principles which they have followed for many years.
The court enforces the contract through and by force of
the statutes of adoption and descent.. It is one of the maxims
20Roberts v. Roberts, 223 Fed. 775; Willis v. Zerger, 258 fli. 574;
Gladville v. McDole, 247 Ill.
34.
21 Taylor v. Theiman, 132 Wis. 38; Sandham v. Ground, 94 Fed. 83;
In re Carroll, 219 Pa. 440.
22Woods v. Evans, 113 Ill.
186; Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Ill.
229.
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of equity that equity considers that as done which should have
been done. The court considers that the requirements of the
statute have been performed, and then, with the aid of the
statute of descent, give the complainant the share to which
he would be entitled.23 "In so holding we do no violence to
the statutes of inheritance. We simply hold that equity will
consider that Frank C. Barney was in all respects the legally
adopted son of the Barneys, and that the surviving spouse of
Annie C. Hutchinson, as well as her collateral heirs, cannot
be heard to dispute that which the ancestor would be estopped from asserting. The laws of inheritance consequently
are not impaired, but follow their natural course. They operate upon the relation created by the contract the same as
though the legal adoption had taken place." 24Such was the
language of the court in Barney v. Hutchinson.
Again in Thomas v. Maloney2 5 "The contract for the benefit of
plaintiff made by her mother was valid in equity; and when
plaintiff performed it and her foster parents received the
benefit of her performance she became, in equity, their adopted child. Equity will treat as done that which ought to
have been done, and as Basley in his lifetime would not be
heard to repudiate the obligation of a contract of which he
had received the full benefit, neither will his executor be allowed to stand on ground so inequitable."
In the same case, the court added: "In effect, this meant
that in adopting the child they would give it a status of an
issue of their own bodies-no more, no less. A statutory deed
of adoption would have conferred on the child these precise
rights and nothing more. Without any specific agreement
to that effect, a child legally adopted will inherit from its
adoptive parents in like manner as their lawful issue."
The 'Statute of Frauds does not apply to cases of this type,
but since a contract to adopt in itself does not create any
legal status, because of the fact that the statute must be
strictly followed, such contracts are analogous to contracts
within the Statute of Frauds which have not been reduced to
writing. Such a contract, also, has really no legal effect,
but still it may become effective through the aid of a court
of equity.26
Let us compare an otal contract within the Statute of
Martin v. Martin, 250 Mo. 539.
25 N. Mex. 82.
25 142 Mo. App. 193.

23
24

26 Lynn v. Hockaday, 162 Mo. 111.
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Frauds and a contract to adopt. And as an example of a
contract within the Statute of Frauds let us take a contract
to will and convey property. Such contracts are similar in
that (1) either of the two contracts is ineffectual if executory, (in both cases a statute has provided the means which
must be complied with before the courts of law will recognize them); (2) a contract of adoption fully performed is
enforceable upon the identical equitable principles upon which
a court of equity will grant relief of a parol contract within
the Statute of Frauds which has been fully performed; (3)
each of the contracts must be established by clear and certain evidence.
The contracts differ in that (1) the contracts to will or convey relate. to property, while a contract to adopt relates to a
status, the incident of which is the right to inherit, (excluding the degree of evidence to support it, it is immaterial
whether the contract to adopt is written or oral); (2) the
contract to will or convey property cannot be defeated by
the promissor, by leaving a will or conveying the property
with the intention of defeating the contract; a contract to
adopt may, as far as inheritance is concerned, be defeated.
The parent may dispose of his property 2before
his death or
7
leave a will disinheriting the adopted child.
But suppose that the Statute of Frauds did apply to a contract such as that in question, it would still be enforced in
equity to prevent fraud. This was pointed out in 'Willisv.
Zorger:28 "In equity, 'the rights and duties of the parties are
the same as they would have been if the contract had been written and signed, and unless the one who has performed the contract in good faith can be made whole in damages, he is left
without any adequate remedy at law, and equity will compel
the other party to do the thing which was agreed to be done.'
... There is no adequate remedy at law for appellant if the evidence in this record sustains the allegations of the bill. He has
fully carried out his part of the contract. He could not recover
at law, because of the Statute of Limitations, for his labor during many years of this service."
In the case of Winkelmann v. Winkelmann the complainant
was an adult when the bill was filed, and, as we know, the court
granted the relief. It might, at first glance, appear that
court is allowing the adoption of an adult. Although this
27

Odenbreit v. Utheim, 131 Minn. 56.

28

258 Ill. 574.
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is permissible in many states, 2 9 it 81is not allowed in Illinois,80
nor in a number of other states.
The decision of Winkelmann v. Winkelmann does not hold,
however, that an adult may be adopted. The axiom that equity
considers that as done which should have been done, is
brought forth and the court holds that the adoption was
complete as of the day when the defective adoption was performed. Applying this to the case of Winkelmann v. Winkelmann, the court holds that the complainant was adopted at the
time of the oral contract, and not as of the time of the decree in
the case.
Watts v.DuU3 2 is not inconsistent. In this ease, the complainant brought a bill to set aside a decree of partition on the grounds
that she was a legally adopted child of the deceased, the
owner of the property before partition, and had had no notice
of the proceedings. The complainant was adopted by Catherine Jarvis, the deceased woman, by a proceeding in the
County Court to which the husband of the deceased Catherine Jarvis was not made a party. The complainant argued
that as the husband was non compos mentis and in the state
asylum, it was unnecessary to make him a party. The
court held that the statute must be strictly complied with,
and as it calls for the husband and wife both joining, the insanity of the husband did not excuse them from joining the
husband. The court held the adoption was defective, and as
the complainant was not a child of Catherine Jarvis she was
not entitled to notice.
In this case there was an attempt by incapacitated parties to
comply with the statute which merely fell short of the requirements, but in Winkelmann v. Winkelmann there was an intent by
competent parties, but no attempt to carry through the procedure called for by the statute. In the former no adoption
could have been decreed even though attempted, but in the
latter if there had been an attempt, it would have been successful.
One might inquire, "What is the benefit or need of the
statute of adoption, if the court of equity will grant specific
29 Collamore v. Learned, 171 Mass. 99; Succession of Caldwell, 114
La. 195; Sheffield v. Franklin, 151 Ala. 492; In re Moran's Estate,
151. Mo. 555; Norton v. Stark, 294 S. W. 689 (Tex. Civ. App.); Markover v. Krauss, 132 Ind. 294.
.OBartholow v. Davies, 276 Ill. 505.
81 First National Bank v. Mott, 101 Fla. 3; Williams v. Knight, 18
R. I. 333; Souga v. Soo Martinho Society, 24 Hawaii 643.
82 184 Ill. 86.
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performance of the contract, even though the statutory provisions are not met?" The answer is: The courts grant. such
relief only through the force and effect of the statute, and
without some statutory provision for adoption it is very
doubtful whether the court could grant relief, no matter how
equitable the case would be. It must be remembered that if
the statute is complied with, the Probate Court, while administering the estate, will treat the adopted person as an
heir, without the aid of a court of equity. This saves much
time and expense for all concerned.
Now that it has been shown that the courts will grant specific
performance of a contract to adopt, let us attempt to reconcile
the inconsistency pointed out in the opening paragraph. The
case of People ex rel v. Wethel,8 8 may give us some help. In that
case the court said that while the statute of adoption is in
derogation of the common law, it is highly remedial and
charitable in that it provides a method whereby children who
would otherwise be the object of public charity are suitably
provided for by the persons who assume a legal duty to do so.
Such contracts, even though they conferred no
4 rights at common law were not opposed to public policy.
It seems perfectly proper and just that the courts should
grant relief to a person who has been considered a child by
the person who attempted to adopt him. The mere fact that
the statute has not been complied with cannot alter the status
of the persons as far as natural love and affection are concerned.
If the child and parent considered themselves as such while
alive, (and the status created by adoption has received legislative sanction), why should not the law consider them as
such at the death of the adopting parent? It appears that
the courts apply good, sound, and humane reasoning. The
deceased must have considered the complainant more than a
stranger. His conduct, in every case, shows that, and if it
does not, the court of equity 'will not grant relief, as no contract is proved. He is presumed to know how the statute of
descent distributes the property that he leaves after him, and
that his children will share. If he wanted this adopted, or
semi-adopted, child to take nothing, he could have made a
will and disinherited him. The courts, in granting relief, do
not overstep their jurisdiction. They, in the opinion of the
writer, wield their great, although limited, powers to do jus88 202 1l. App. 77.
34 In re Herrick's Estate, 124 Minn. 85; Winne v. Winne, 166 N. Y.
263; Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Ill.
229.
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tice to an injured party. It would be exceedingly unfair to
refuse such relief to the complainant. He has performed an
immeasurable amount of services, and unless the court of
equity grants relief, he will receive no compensation, not even
the amount a child ordinarily receives. The collateral heirs,
whose services could not be as great, would get the portion
to which the complainant is entitled. This would be a great
injustice.

